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We study empirically if countries that default on their debt experience a reduction in their
capital in°ows as suggested by the literature. Our data contains information on (i) the defaulter
countries and their creditors and (ii) bilateral foreign direct investment (FDI) °ows. With this
we can study how FDI °ows are a®ected by sovereign default distinguishing among those coming
from defaulters' creditor countries and others. According to our estimations, this distinction is
crucial since the decline of FDI in°ows after default is markedly concentrated on those °ows
originating in defaulters' creditor countries. The decay in FDI °ows is higher in the years closer
to the default date and for countries that have defaulted more times. We do not ¯nd evidence
that countries shut their doors to defaulters' investment abroad, which is also a punishment
suggested in the literature.
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From time to time some countries restructure or default on their sovereign foreign debt. The fact
that in sovereign markets there are no analogues to bankruptcy laws and procedures as those that
exist in domestic debt markets rises a number of interesting issues. One of them is the well known
question of why countries ever repay their debts given that their creditors don't have expedite tools
to recoup the defaulted amount and impose a penalty on the defaulter. Since cross-border lending
to sovereign entities is actually observed, it seems obvious that default is deterred through some
mechanism. Our goal in this paper is to provide empirical evidence on one of the potential costs
that defaulter countries might su®er: a decrease of capital in°ows. This channel might serve as a
punishment to deter future defaults and help then explain why cross-border sovereign debt markets
actually exists.
Several theoretical papers use the exclusion from international capital markets as the pun-
ishment from default (see Eaton and Fernandez (1995) for a survey of the literature). The seminal
paper of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) considers that if countries do default on their debts then they
are excluded from international capital markets. In these models, countries repay their debts to
maintain a reputation of good payer and in this way keep their access to international borrowing.
However, Bulow and Rogo® (1989) claim that the sole prevention of future lending to a defaulter
cannot be an equilibrium punishment if the defaulter has access to cash-in-advance contracts where
it can invest the money that should be used to repay debt. Thus, cutting o® access to future bor-
rowing cannot alone enforce repayment if the defaulter keeps access to the referred cash-in-advance
contracts after defaulting. Notwithstanding the in°uential point made by Bulow and Rogo® (1989),
in recent years some authors have revived from a theoretical perspective the exclusion from inter-
national capital markets as an e®ective punishment mechanism to enforce payment of sovereign
debt contracts. The ¯rst of these is the model of Wright (2002) where repayment is an equilibrium
outcome in the world of Bulow and Rogo® (1989) when lenders have enough incentives to tacitly
collude in punishing a country in default. Along di®erent lines Amador (2003) presents a political-
economy game where politicians repay sovereign debt precisely because they fear losing access to
international capital markets during future periods in power.
The importance of exclusion from capital markets remains an open empirical question. In
this paper we study the relevance of this channel considering di®erent characteristics of the debtor-
creditor relationship, of the default and of defaulting countries that may a®ect their access to
international capital markets.
To conduct the analysis, we use data on FDI °ows and defaults which are both of bilateral
2nature. The data on FDI allows us to identify which country is the source and which country is
the host or recipient of FDI °ows. Also, as Rose (2005), Martinez and Sandleris (2006) and Arteta
and Hale (2006), to date default episodes we use data on debt restructured at the Paris Club. This
source gives information on the countries that restructured their debts and the speci¯c creditors
that were involved in the renegotiation process. Combining these two data sources we are able
to distinguish if the reduction (if any) of capital in°ows to defaulter countries comes from those
countries directly a®ected by the default or from every country that could be a supplier of foreign
capital.
In addition to allowing us to study issues that have not been analyzed in previous work, this
structure of the data is useful to deal with some identi¯cation concerns that could be present in
previous work that has studied the existence of a punishment mechanism through capital °ows.
Typically the literature has measured sovereign default with a dummy variable indicating the years
during which the country has ceased to comply with its debt obligations. This method to measure
default has a number of potential problems. There is the concern that the default dummy is really
measuring a generalized economic disruption. From this perspective, it is not clear whether a
negative coe±cient of a default dummy on total capital in°ows is really capturing a punishment
imposed by disgruntled creditors or a worsening of defaulters' economic outlook. In contrast to
this, our data allows us to distinguish if the decline in capital (FDI) in°ows is from those countries
which debts were defaulted upon or, in addition, from other countries. A general decline in capital
in°ows might be related to a worsening in the economic situation of the defaulter while a decline
from those countries directly involved in the default would be more related to a punishment to the
defaulter.
The other advantage of the data assembled in this paper in comparison to previous work in
the literature is that it reduces the problem of reverse causality that might hamper the identi¯cation
of a punishment through capital in°ows to defaulter countries. Since countries to which the debtor
country defaults upon were \selected" when the debt contracts were signed, the composition of this
group of countries is already de¯ned at the moment of default. This feature of the data indicates
that our default measure is unlikely to be a®ected by current FDI °ows.
The evidence we present in this paper suggests that countries directly involved in the default
reduce their capital °ows to the defaulter country. On the contrary, there is no evidence that capital
°ows from those countries to which the debtor does not default diminish in the aftermath of sovereign
default. This seems to indicate the existence of a punishment to defaulting countries imposed by
their creditors. This punishment appears to be signi¯cant from an economic and statistical point
of view.
3We also analyze if the amount of debt defaulted is important for the the punishment. The
premise is that higher defaults would harm more the international ¯nancial community and therefore
would be more heavily punished. Along with this one can expect that creditors would like to make
the penalty to defaulters contingent on the amount defaulted to provide incentives that lead to
minimize the amount defaulted if countries choose to renege on its external obligations. From an
economic point of view, we do not ¯nd strong evidence that the size of default has a signi¯cant
e®ect on the magnitude of the decline in capital °ows to the defaulter country.
Next we analyze if capital out°ows from defaulting countries are reduced after an event of
default since a possible punishment is that countries close their doors to defaulters investment
abroad. This empirical exercise is inspired by the work of Bulow and Rogo® (1989) and Wright
(2002). As noted above, Bulow and Rogo® (1989) showed that exclusion from capital markets as
default punishment would not be relevant if defaulters have access to an investment technology
abroad and Wright (2002) showed that this punishment is still relevant if international creditors
collude to punish the defaulter preventing it from investing abroad. Here we explore if this reduction
in capital out°ows e®ectively takes place. Our empirical ¯ndings do not support this conjecture
since we do not ¯nd evidence that defaulter countries' investment abroad is reduced after a default.
The theoretical literature highlights that countries would repay their debts to maintain their
reputation which is a synonym for having access to international capital markets. Although in
general it considers trigger strategies where a country that defaults looses its reputation and is
excluded from capital markets inde¯nitely, it is natural to think that in reality reputation would
depend on several factors. It is more likely that after a default countries lose their capital market
access temporarily, regaining it after a period of time rather than seeing their capital access perma-
nently denied. In this respect we ¯nd that the longer the time elapsed since a default, the larger the
capital in°ows to the defaulter country. This ¯nding suggests that countries lose their reputation
only temporarily. We also examine if reputation is important by analyzing the number of defaults
that a country has declared in the past. Here the premise is that countries with a higher number of
defaults would have a worse reputation than countries with a lower number of defaults. The results
we obtain con¯rm this: countries with a large track record on defaults receive lower capital °ows.
Since Paris Club debt includes only o±cial debt we are considering only sovereign defaults
in our analysis.1 On the other hand, there are many kinds of cross-border capital °ows and we
focus our study in one of them, FDI °ows, which have become the main source of capital °ows to
developing countries. FDI °ows are mainly transactions among private parties so it might not be
immediately apparent why a sovereign default might a®ect them. Nevertheless, the use of FDI °ows
1As noted below there are many de¯nitions of defaults and one of them has to be chosen in order to conduct the
analysis.
4can be justi¯ed on several grounds. The theoretical literature on the exclusion of capital markets as
a possible punishment to defaulters does not distinguish between types of capital °ows, but rather
talk about exclusion from capital markets in general. From the prospective of this work, the use
of FDI data is useful because it is one of the few cross-border capital °ows for which there exists
bilateral data that identi¯es both countries included in each deal for an extended period of time. As
explained earlier this feature of the data is crucial to our identi¯cation strategy of a punishment for
sovereign default. Finally, it is an open empirical question if sovereign default has an e®ect on capital
°ows to defaulting countries. To give a real world example about this potential punishment channel,
we cite segments of an article that appeared in September of 2006 in an Argentine newspaper that
highlights the potential e®ects of sovereign default on private capital °ows and also suggest the
bilateral nature of the possible punishment, which is, as noted above, a key point in our study.
\... countries are nervous because they do not know what would happen with the renegotiation
of Argentine debt at the Paris Club. ... Meanwhile diplomat sources argue that ¯rms in their
countries cannot realize investments in Argentina because they cannot insure these as a consequence
of not paying the debt.... In Japan they consider that this would a®ect the bilateral relations."2
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a review of the related empirical liter-
ature, Section 3 describes the data on FDI °ows and on defaults that we use in the paper, Section
4 discusses the empirical methodology and some econometric issues that arise. Section 5 presents
the results while section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Literature Review
Now lets turn our attention to the the literature that has studied, from an empirical point of
view, the reasons why sovereign countries repay their foreign debts and the related question of the
sanctions that fall upon defaulting countries. We will review the evidence on each of the punishment
channels that have been mentioned in the theoretical literature. First we will consider the extent
to which defaulter countries experience a greater di±culties to borrow from international capital
markets. These di±culties can take two forms: exclusion from new funds and/or an increase in the
cost of the funds borrowed.
An important body of evidence on this issue originates in the work that followed the Debt
Crises of the 1980s, when developing countries -especially in Latin America- defaulted on their
2See article appeared in \La Naci¶ on" titled \Traba inversiones la falta de avances con el Club de Par¶ ³s" in Sep-
tember 4 of 2006. The original article was translated by the authors to make the citation.
5foreign debt obligations. Regarding the eventual costs of defaulting both Eichengreen (1989) and
Lindert and Morton (1989) found no evidence that defaulters were punished by creditors through
higher interest rates on new loans. Moreover, those authors show that defaulters and non-defaulters
were both excluded from international capital markets. This ¯nding might be in part due to the
fact, acknowledged by the authors, that they use post-Debt Crisis data where capital °ows to all
developing countries came to a complete stop. In a related paper Ozler (1993) ¯nds that past
defaulters did have to pay a premium on the interest rate for sovereign debt issued in the 1970s.
He ¯nds that defaults previous to 1930 do not a®ect the premium paid but defaults after that year
do a®ect it. However, the premium is quantitatively small and does not constitute a punishment
that appears likely to deter future defaults.
After a long hiatus the empirical literature on the costs of default revived again in recent
years after the sovereign defaults of Russia in 1997 and Argentina in 2001.3 Eichengreen and Portes
(2000) revisit the historical evidence on the costs of default focusing on access to international capital
markets and the premium on the interest rate paid by each country. Regarding the ¯rst of these,
they ¯nd no clear evidence that previous default hinders access to international capital markets
when analyzing post World War II data. Along with this, there is no robust evidence that countries
that have defaulted on their sovereign obligations end up paying a higher premium on subsequent
debt issues.4 This result is also corroborated by Obstfeld and Taylor (2004) who ¯nd a \surprisingly
small" e®ect of past default on the interest rate spread of sovereign debt. Eichengreen and Portes
(2000) also look at the more recent evidence of debt issues of the 1990s and also ¯nd no evidence that
previous debt rescheduling limits access to international capital markets. Nevertheless, countries
that have failed to meet the original terms of their foreign obligations face a interest rate spread
which, although signi¯cant, does not appear to forbid these countries access to new international
credit.
Apart from these traditional punishment mechanisms of access to international capital markets
some recent papers have explored other channels that the theoretical literature has identi¯ed as
potential deterrents for sovereign default. One of these is the work of Mitchener and Weidenmeir
(2005) that ¯nds, using early 20th century data, that super-sanctions appear to be an e®ective
mechanism to deter new defaulters. These super-sanctions include military aggressions by creditor
countries and the forceful seizure of foreign currency-generating assets (e.g. the national customs
administration) of defaulting countries. Even though Mitchener and Weidenmeir (2005) is one of
the ¯rst papers to identify empirically an e®ective punishment for defaulters, these sanctions might
3One of the central themes of this more recent work is to design optimal institutions to deal with sovereign default,
especially the role of the Bretton Woods institutions in the aftermath of default. This topic is beyond the scope of
this paper, see Eichengreen and Portes (1995) and Eichengreen and Portes (2000) for a thorough discussion of this
issue.
4This evidence is reported in Tables 3 and 4 of Eichengreen and Portes (2000)
6be di±cult to implement nowadays. 5
Finally, Rose (2005) studies another possible punishment mechanism: the reduction in bi-
lateral trade that might follow after a sovereign default. As reviewed earlier, this is one of the
channels that the theoretical literature has identi¯ed as a potential cost of default. One of the most
interesting features of Rose (2005) is that his data identi¯es both the defaulter and the creditor
countries involved in each default episode. Combining this information with bilateral trade data
he ¯nds that trade between a defaulting country and its creditors declines following a default. His
estimations indicates that the reduction in bilateral trade is equal to 8% per year and lasts for up
to 15 years. In a related paper, Martinez and Sandleris (2006) argue that, even though countries'
international trade declines after declaring sovereign default, the decay is not concentrated in the
bilateral trade with creditor countries.
Similarly to Rose (2005) and Martinez and Sandleris (2006), we will use bilateral data to test
for the existence of punishment to defaulters. Nevertheless, we will focus on bilateral capital °ows
instead of goods and services' trade and study a more ample set of punishment mechanisms. We
will describe now the main features of our database and how it allows us to test several dimensions
of an eventual punishment to defaulting countries.
As will be explained later, the use of bilateral capital °ows data allows to identify with greater
accuracy the existence of an access-to-international-capital-markets punishment mechanism. In
particular, we are able to distinguish between a \general" and \creditor speci¯c" punishment, similar
to what Martinez and Sandleris (2006) analyze for trade °ows. Since we are able to distinguish
among North-to-South and South-to-North capital °ows, another contribution of the paper is that
we can test if defaulters are also limited in their investment options abroad. As explained earlier
this is also a punishment mechanism suggested by the literature and we will test its empirical
relevance here. The fact that we distinguish the direction of the °ow is an important di®erence
with the literature that has focused on trade °ows. In particular we will study how capital °ows
from country i to country j change when j defaults to i and also how the capital °ows from j to i
are a®ected by j's default. In contrast Rose (2005) and Martinez and Sandleris (2006) focus on the
sum of both exports from i to j and from j to i. In the case of capital °ows it is very important
to make this distinction since they correspond to two di®erent mechanisms through which the cost
of default can appear. From this perspective, our paper will complement previous e®orts that have
analyzed if capital in°ows to defaulting countries decline in the aftermath of default. The details
of the database that will allow us to implement this test are given in the next section.
5Wright (2002) illustrates the di±culties of imposing direct sanctions to sovereign defaulters with an eloquent
narrative of the failed attempts of one of Russia's creditors to seize that country's assets.
73 Bilateral Capital Flows and Defaults Database
In order to test if defaulter countries are punished by their disgruntled creditors we need two pieces
of information: (1) the identity of the creditor countries to which the country defaulted and (2)
information on some economic interaction between the creditor and defaulter countries that allow
to judge if the latter punish defaulting countries. The information on defaulter and creditor country
pairs comes from the Paris Club renegotiations and debt restructuring database. With regard to
the economic interaction among the creditor and the defaulter, in this paper we use FDI °ows
among them to gauge the existence of punishment for defaulting countries. As explained in Section
1 the eventual reduction of bilateral FDI °ows could be a relevant punishment mechanism and its
analysis is the main contribution of the paper. We will obtain the data on bilateral FDI °ows from
the OECD (see OECD (2004)). Let's now provide a brief description of each of these data sources.
3.1 The Paris Club
The Paris Club is an organization of o±cial creditors that meet several times a year to agree
on restructuring deals of sovereign obligations of countries undergoing repayment di±culties. The
debts subject to rescheduling are those subscribed by sovereign governments or that have an explicit
guarantee of the public sector. Countries undergoing payment di±culties can apply to the Paris
Club in order to obtain debt relief by the creditor countries. The negotiations take place under the
following four principles:6
1. Imminent Default: there must be an agreement that the debtor country is not going to be able
to meet its foreign obligations under the current conditions. For this agreement to be reached,
the IMF issues a report indicating that the country is headed towards sovereign default. In
practice when countries apply for a Paris Club rescheduling they usually have already failed
to meet some of their sovereign debt payments.7
2. IMF Plan: the debtor country must have agreed to an Appropriate Conditionality IMF plan.
This requirement aims to assure that the debtor country is committed to a set of economic
policies consistent with macroeconomic order and an increased probability of debt repayment.
3. Equitable Burden Sharing: all creditors must participate in the debt relief operation. An
important exception to this principle are the debts owed to the IMF who in turn is expected
to provide fresh ¯nancing for the debtor in distress. Moreover, the debtor agrees to refuse
6This information appears in Eichengreen and Portes (1995) and Rose (2005)
7This seems to have been the regular practice during the debt crisis of the 1980s according to Somerville (1990).
8debt relief from other creditors (i.e. outside the Paris Club) that o®er them worse conditions
than those agreed with the Paris Club.
4. Consensus: all members of the Club must agree to the debt relief plan granted to the debtor.
Even though this clause could potentially delay agreements it has not been the case in practice
as negotiations are fully ¯nished in most cases in less than a year.8
The Paris Club's website provides information on all the restructuring deals that have been
reached including:
² The countries participating in each restructuring deal identifying in particular all the creditor
countries involved in each deal.
² The amounts of sovereign debt restructured.
² Other details of the renegotiation such as type of deal and time allowed for repayment.
For the purpose of this paper, the most useful information is that contained in the ¯rst two
elements just listed. We collected the information on all the Paris Club deals since this organization
started functioning in 1956 until 2003. In Table 1 we present the complete list of all the countries
that have renegotiated their debt at the Paris Club since 1980.9
It should be noted that the Paris Club data is, up to our knowledge, the only source that iden-
ti¯es the countries to which each defaulter fails to meet the contractual obligations. The information
of the individual creditors to which a country defaulted is a key element of our identi¯cation strat-
egy of a capital-°ows punishment mechanism since it allows us to distinguish among two di®erent
phenomena:
² A generalized sanction which corresponds to a decrease in capital in°ows from all countries
that can potentially invest in the defaulting country.
² A creditor-speci¯c mechanism that is related to the decline of FDI in°ows originating in the
creditor countries to which the recipient country defaulted.
8See Eichengreen and Portes (1995) and Rose (2005)
9The reader will notice that the default of Argentina in 2001 is not included in the list. Our data on FDI °ows
spans only through 2003 and Argentina started negotiating with the Paris Club after that year but at the time of
this writing no agreement between the two parties had been reached. The omission of Argentina's most recent default
episodes does not appear to a®ect our results: as a consistency check we ran all the regressions presented in Section
5 up to the year 2000 and the results don't change.
9The ability to sort between these two e®ects is one of the main contributions of this paper.
As we explain in Section 4 below, previous work on the e®ect of default on capital °ows assumes
that defaulter countries are punished uniformly by all countries and this might explain why there
is no conclusive evidence that foreign capital in°ows are reduced in the aftermath of a sovereign
default.
The possibility to identify both the defaulter and the creditors of each default is the key
characteristic of the Paris Club data. The other indicators of default that are available, notably
Standard and Poor's, only indicate the identity of the defaulter. Nevertheless both sources for
default information tend to coincide. In Appendix A we provide a detailed comparison of both data
sources.
It is important to note that Paris Club agreements are best characterized as a restructuring
of sovereign obligations that involves a \haircut" of varying intensity in the amount the defaulting
country will repay to its creditors. In this sense, Paris Club deals do not represent a complete cease
of payments of sovereign debt. Hence, the expression \sovereign default" should be interpreted
really as a \sovereign restructuring" and we will use the terms interchangeably. This feature is
by no means a limitation of our data since the complete renege by a country of its foreign debts
is an extremely rare event: most \defaults" are really restructuring of previously agreed payment
schedules. 10
The Paris Club restructuring deals can be classi¯ed in four di®erent categories: \Classic",
\Houston", \Naples" and \Cologne". The last three types of agreements are reserved for Highly-
Indebted countries and contemplate explicit reductions of the debtor's obligations. Nevertheless,
these agreements exist only since 1994 and have been used mainly by poor countries that have also
quali¯ed for other debt relief programs (e.g. the HIPC initiative). Indeed, the majority of the debt
rescheduling agreements in our database correspond to the so called \Classic" rescheduling deals. In
these negotiations, the creditors concessions consist in an extension of the period over which debts
must be repayed and an interest rate that assures reduction of the present value of the obligations.
Nevertheless this does not imply that creditors do not grant some amount of debt relief: Roubini
and Setser (2004) indicate that when the new schedule of payments is discounted at the market
discount rates, the result is a signi¯cant reduction in the net present value of the creditors' claims.
In synthesis then, the \Classic" agreements of the Paris Club most likely include a \haircut" to the
value of the defaulting country's debt but we don't have detailed information on the exact amount
10See Rose (2005) for a discussion of this issue. The interchangeable use of the terms \default" and \restructuring"
is also common in many other papers that study sovereign default as exempli¯ed by Reinhart, Rogo®, and Savastano
(2003).
10of it.11
3.2 Foreign Direct Investment Data
As we have explained, we will analyze the cost of sovereign default looking at the behavior of FDI
activity. This type of capital °ow is almost always a transaction among private entities. Our default
measure on the other hand corresponds to default by sovereign nations which are public entities.
Even though these facts might be a concern, in the real world there are channels through which
sovereign defaults a®ect investments in those countries, for example, the ability of insurance and
funds to ¯nance such investments is reduced (see, for example, the press note quoted Section 1). In
the end, the e®ects of sovereign defaults on private capital °ows, like FDI, remains a question to
be answered through empirical analysis and one of the main goals of this paper is to provide more
systematic evidence on the empirical relevance of these issues.12
The data on FDI bilateral °ows comes from the OECD's \International Direct Investment
Statistics Yearbook" (see OECD (2004)) which contains information for the years 1980 to 2003.
This publication contains information on both FDI bilateral °ows and stocks between reporting
OECD countries and between those same countries and a selected group of non-OECD countries.13
The whole set of countries is listed in Table 2. As can be seen we have further divided OECD in two
groups: Industrial OECD and Developing OECD where the latter group comprises countries who
have become members of the OECD in the last ten years or whose income levels are signi¯cantly
below those of the Industrial OECD. The reason for this classi¯cation is that the data coverage
between these two groups is very di®erent so this classi¯cation allows us to increase the total
number of country-pairs observations available. 14
The basic features of the Paris Club rescheduling agreements and the FDI °ows are presented
in Tables 3 and 4. There are 21,475 valid bilateral FDI °ows observations the majority of which
is concentrated among the Industrial OECD countries as column 4 of Table 3 shows. This is in
part due to the fact that reporting countries are precisely those in the OECD but also re°ects
a well known feature of international capital markets: the bulk of cross-border capital °ows takes
11The losses su®ered by creditors varies signi¯cantly in di®erent renegotiation processes. Sturzenegger and
Zettelmeyer (2005) and Jorgensen and Sachs (1989) looking at various rescheduling episodes across a wide histor-
ical period report that the size of the debt relief granted to defaulters varies between 15% and 70%.
12Other work that has tried to look at cost of sovereign default have also analyzed the e®ect on outcomes on the
private sector. See for example Eichengreen and Mody (1998), Eichengreen and Mody (1999).
13This data set has been widely used in the study of FDI. See for instance Levy-Yeyati, Stein, and Daude (2004)
and Daude and Stein (2006)
14See Data Appendix for details on the data coverage of the FDI database.
11place between rich countries. Nevertheless, rich-country to poor-country capital °ows are signi¯cant
amounting to 13% of all the capital °ows in the sample and in per capita terms represent a number
in the order of magnitude of those observed within rich-countries. One potential drawback of this
data is that it contains very little information on FDI °ows originating in Non-OECD countries.
This small-sample problem might be a concern in order to test another of the potential punishment
mechanisms identi¯ed by the theoretical literature: the prohibition for defaulting countries to buy
foreign assets.
The characteristics of our bilateral default data are summarized in Table 4. It should be
noted that this statistics were computed for the period 1980-2003, the same for which FDI bilateral
°ows are available. As can be seen in the Table, there are 749 bilateral default observations during
this period. 15 As expected all the defaulter countries are located outside the Industrial OECD
where the vast majority of creditor countries belong to. Table 4 also reveals that Paris Club deals
involve signi¯cant amounts of country's debts so they represent genuine episodes of con°ict between
creditors and debtors.
Finally the gross (i.e. not distinguishing by type of country pair) descriptive statistics of the
FDI and the default variables are presented in Table 5. As can be seen there are negative °ows
in the data. Since the data we have measures gross °ows, the occurrence of negative FDI °ows
is not surprising since rational investors can decide to decrease the stock of investment in certain
countries. Moreover, this feature of the data suggests that the eventual punishment might occur
not only through a reduction in in°ows but also through an increase in out°ows.
4 Empirical Methodology
4.1 Econometric Speci¯cation
The methodology we will use in this paper to study the punishment mechanism to defaulting
countries using bilateral FDI °ows is based on the econometric speci¯cations used more frequently
in the literature. The empirical determinants of FDI have been studied in several papers and we will
draw on them for our estimation equation.16 Since at this time there is no consensus in the literature
regarding which is the \correct" econometric model, the regression we use captures elements from
15The ¯rst Paris Club agreement was in 1956 and there were several renegotiating deals in the 1970s. It should be
noted though that the Reputation and Punishment dummies are calculated from 1956 on. See Section 4 for details.
16See for example Blonigen (2005), Blonigen, Davies, and Head (2003), Daude and Stein (2006), Razin, Sadka, and
Tong (2005), Razin, Rubinstein, and Sadka (2004) and Levy-Yeyati, Panizza, and Stein (2002).
12the ones most commonly used in previous work on the ¯eld. The speci¯c model we use is the
following panel regression:
Yijt = ¯ Parisijt + ° Unilateraljt + ± Amountjt + µ Excludeijt + ­Zijt +
¦Xijt + ®ij + ²ijt
(1)
Where:
1. Yijt corresponds to the FDI °ows from country i to country j in year t normalized by country's
j GDP in year t.17
2. Parisijt is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if country j restructured its sovereign
obligations to country i in year t through a Paris Club deal and 0 otherwise.
3. Unilateraljt is an indicator variable that is equal to 1 if country j start a restructuring of its
foreign sovereign debts in year t through the Paris Club and 0 otherwise.
4. Amountjt corresponds to the total value of the debts that the defaulter country (j) asks its
creditors to be rescheduled in the Paris Club deal taking place in t. This variable is also
normalized by country's j GDP in period t. We should make two important caveats here.
First, the Paris Club database does not contain information on the amount the defaulter
country wants to reschedule with each one of its creditors, only the aggregated amount.
Hence, the data on the amount defaulted will only allow us to test for an aggregate e®ect
and not a bilateral-speci¯c punishment. Furthermore, the Amount variable measures only the
amount brought by the defaulter country to the negotiating table, it does indicate the capital
loss agreed upon by the creditors after the deal is ¯nalized. In this sense, Amount does not
measure the true amount of default and is only a proxy of the true losses (if any) that the
defaulting country imposes on its creditors. In spite of this we will use Amountjt to gauge if
the size of default in°uences the extent of the reputation loss for the country.
5. Excludeijt is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if country i defaulted on its external oblig-
ations to country j in year t. A negative coe±cient µ will provide support to the hypothesis
that defaulters are punished through a reduced menu of investment options.
17There is a slight di®erence in the de¯nition of the Y variable between the Capital Flows and the International
Trade literatures. The latter includes in Y the total volume of trade between country i and j in year t while the
Capital Flows only uses the the unidirectional °ow from i to j. Our de¯nition of the Y variable follows then the
common de¯nition of the Capital Flows literature in order to make our results comparable to previous work.
136. Z is a matrix of controls that measure di®erent features of the previous history of defaults.
With these variables we will try to study dynamic aspects of the the punishment that creditors
might impose on defaulters. These variables are:
² Periods elapsed since last default. With this variable we intend to measure how quickly
creditors \forgive" default.
² Number of defaults in last k years. This variable will capture if creditors forget defaults
that have taken place in the past and the extent to which they remember (and punish)
more when defaults have been more frequent. We use two values for k, 5 and 10.
² A default in the last k years. We also use 5 and 10 as possible values of k. These are
dummy variables that are equal, respectively, to one when country j defaulted to country
i in any of the k years before t.
It is important to clarify that all the variables in Z are computed since 1956 and 2003 that
corresponds to the whole period of operation of the Paris Club. Since the FDI data begins
in 1980 this implies that the inclusion of the reputational variables included in Z in equation
(1) does not change the sample on which we tested our other speci¯cations. Hence, we can
assess that any eventual changes in our results among the di®erent regressions will not be the
result of changes in the sample.
The structure of Equation (1) allows us to distinguish between two di®erent e®ects of defaults
on FDI in°ows to defaulting countries as discussed in Section 3:
² A generalized decline from the international community measured by coe±cient °.
² A speci¯c decrease of FDI from the creditor countries to which the recipient country defaulted
upon. This e®ect is measured by our estimate of ¯.
The identi¯cation of these two di®erent e®ects is due to the way in which the variables Paris
and Unilateral are de¯ned. If country j defaults on its sovereign debt in period t, FDI to it from the
typical country in the world would decline in ° units. In addition to this there will an incremental
decline in FDIijt °ows to country j if country i is a creditor of j.
It should also be noted that our variable Unilateral is also a proxy of the fact that the
defaulting country (j) is undergoing a period of macroeconomic distress in period t. Therefore
the coe±cient ° can also be interpreted as the e®ect on FDI in°ows of the economic crisis that
the recipient country is experimenting whereas ¯ captures the additional decline from the creditor
countries.
14The ability to distinguish among these channels is an important di®erence with previous
studies that have tried to gauge if defaulter countries lose access to international capital markets.
The econometric speci¯cation used in those papers (reviewed in Section 2) assumes that capital
°ows to the defaulter fall uniformly from all countries no matter if they were directly involved in
the default. The impossibility to use a more °exible speci¯cation might be the reason why previous
studies don't ¯nd strong evidence that countries su®er the cost of smaller capital in°ows after
defaulting on their foreign debts.
In matrix Xijt we include a number of controls variables that should in°uence bilateral FDI
°ows from a theoretical standpoint and are commonly included in empirical models used to analyze
bilateral FDI. 18 The variables included in X and their expected e®ect on the amount of bilateral
FDI observed between countries i and j are the following:
² GDP per capita of country j in year t. As is well known, most FDI is received by developed
countries so controlling for this variable is important. This variable will also capture institu-
tional characteristics which not be picked up by the institutions variables detailed below.
² An indicator variable if country i and j have a trade agreement in year t. This variable is
expected to in°uence the °ow of FDI between a pair of countries but the direction is not clear.
If, on the one hand, FDI is driven by an incentive to \jump tari®s" and other barriers to trade,
then a trade agreement between a pair of countries will lead to a smaller amount of FDI. On
the other hand, if FDI is motivated by a desire to locate the di®erent stages of the production
process in the optimal location, then a trade agreement might increase the amount of FDI.
This because lower trade barriers will make it more convenient for multinational ¯rms to ship
un¯nished goods across national borders and hence increase the incentives to build factories
in di®erent locations.19
² A measure of the level of ¯nancial development in country j. For this we compute the ratio
of credit to the private sector to GDP using data from the IFS as suggested by Beck, Levine,
and Loayza (1999). The sign on this variable can be either negative or positive. On the
one hand, this variable can have negative coe±cient since if, all else constant, the receiving
country's capital markets are more developed there is relatively less need of foreign capital
because domestic savings can be e±ciently channeled to pro¯table projects. On the other
hand, Alfaro, Chanda, Kalemli-Ozcan, and Sayek (2004) show that FDI has a bigger impact
in the receiving country's economic growth when ¯nancial markets are more developed. Hence,
18See for example Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan, and Volosovych (2005b) and Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan, and Volosovych
(2005a) who study the determinants of unilateral capital °ows and Levy-Yeyati, Stein, and Daude (2004) and Daude
and Stein (2006) that use a model similar to ours for bilateral FDI stocks.
19See Carr, Markusen, and Maskus (2001) for a discussion of these issues.
15one can expect that countries with more developed ¯nancial markets will receive more FDI
in°ows. It will be an empirical question then to see which of these e®ects dominates.
² Di®erence in the education attainments of countries i and j taken from the Barro and Lee
data set. This is computed as the di®erence in the average years of secondary schooling in
the total population of country j and that of country i. This variable is expected to re°ect
di®erences in the long-run level of income per capita and hence in the marginal product of
capital in the framework of Solow's growth model as explained in Lucas (1990). According to
this logic, the lower the educational attainment in country j with respect to that of country
i the smaller the amount of capital that country j will invest in country i. This variable
has been found to be an important determinant of cross border FDI °ows in the studies that
are inspired by the CMM model as explained by Blonigen (2005) and Carr, Markusen, and
Maskus (2001).
² The ratio of country's j total trade to GDP as a measure of openness to trade. This is
calculated using data from the World Development Indicators (WDI) database. This variable
been found to be an important determinant of the amount of FDI received by a country
(see Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan, and Volosovych (2005b)) since it proxies for the general outward
orientation of the economy and the its level of income. The expected sign of the coe±cient
on this variable is therefore positive.
² In°ation volatility in country j. This variable proxies for the quality of macroeconomic policies
in the receiving country and is expect to exert a negative in°uence in the amount of FDI °ows
received from country i.
² A measure of the degree of openness of the capital account in country j. This series corresponds
to the one constructed in Chinn and Ito (2002) and higher values of it indicate greater degree
of openness to cross-border capital °ows. In light of this we expect a positive coe±cient on
this variable.20
² Variables that measure the quality of institutions in country j, the one at the the receiving end
of the FDI °ow. We use a measure an index of Government Stability and one of Corruption
from the \International Country Risk Guide" by the PRS Group and an indicator for the
degree of constraints on the executive branch of government compiled in the Polity database.
As highlighted by Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan, and Volosovych (2005a) and Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan,
and Volosovych (2005b) the quality of the receiving country's institutions is a key determinant
of its capital in°ows. They operate through the same channels that stimulate investment in
general. Given that increases in all these indexes correspond to better institutions we expect
a positive coe±cient on each of them.
20This indicator of capital account openness synthesizes the restrictions to various types of capital °ows. Therefore,
considering that there might be some degree of substitution among di®erent types of capital °ows, an increase in this
index might not necessarily imply a bigger volume of FDI °ows.
16² An indicator variable that takes the value one in the case that the country has a program with
the IMF. This variable is in the spirit of the literature on the Role of the IMF as catalyzer
of capital °ows (see for example Mody and Saravia (2006)). In our case this variable is also
important because, as explained above, renegotiations in the Club of Paris generally \requires"
an IMF program. Consequently, variables referring to IMF programs and variables indicating
Paris Club renegotiations are likely to be correlated. Thus, in order to disentangle the e®ects
of default the inclusion of this variable is guaranteed.
² And indicator variable that takes the value 1 when country j is su®ering a Balance of Payment
crisis in year t. To compute this variable we use the criteria outlined by Kaminsky and
Reinhart (1999). We include this control to discard the concern that our default variables
Paris and Unilateral are capturing a generalized macroeconomic disruption in country j
and not a punishment from its creditors as we hypothesize.
² GDP gaps both for both countries i and j in year t. The purpose of these variables is to control
for the stage of the business cycle in which both countries are since Levy-Yeyati, Panizza, and
Stein (2002)'s results suggest that FDI exhibit a signi¯cant cyclical component. Along with
this, the inclusion of GDP gaps in the regression will reduce the likelihood that the variable
Paris is capturing a macroeconomic shock common to countries i and j in year t that could
also a®ect FDI °ows instead of the e®ect of sovereign default.
Finally, ®ij is a ¯xed e®ect that will capture all the non-time variant characteristics of the
dyad of countries i and j. The inclusion of this ¯xed e®ect implies that variables like distance
between i and j, common language among the countries and common colonizer will not be included
in the regression equation (1). We prefer to use ¯xed e®ects since this allows to control for all the
unobserved time-invariant country pair characteristics and not only those that can be measured
directly. The last term in regression 1 ²ijt is the random error.
The summary statistics of all the variables included in X are presented in Table 6. The
sources used to collect all the data used in this paper are described in Appendix B. It should be
noted that after the inclusion of all the control variables, we end with approximately 162 dyads of
countries that renegotiated at the Paris Club.
4.2 Some Considerations on the FDI Data
As we mentioned above, all the data used in the estimations are of yearly frequency. This is
especially important in the case of the dependent variable since our approach is di®erent to what
17has been done in most previous FDI studies.21 We opt to use yearly data, which are likely to be
much more volatile than stocks and three-year averages in order to identify appropriately the timing
of the punishment.
A possible shortcoming of the data is the presence of a signi¯cant amount of missing values
for the FDI °ows. This issue has been tackled in di®erent ways by the literature yet we will deal
with it in a di®erent manner. The key issue to ponder is that it is not possible to know if a reported
missing value (of which there are a signi¯cant amount in the data) in a given year-country-pair cell
really corresponds to :
1. A non reported observation of either a positive or negative value of FDI.
2. The absence of FDI °ows between those particular countries in that year.
This issue is further complicated by the fact that FDI °ows can be negative, zero or positive
as are indeed observed in the OECD's database. In econometric terms, our sample su®ers a problem
that is best described as missing data rather than censored or truncated observations.
In light of these considerations, we will depart from the approach taken by Razin, Rubinstein,
and Sadka (2004) who treat the missing values as zero FDI °ows in order to implement Heckman's
sample selection procedure. We do so since, as we just discussed, it is not obvious that reported
missing values correspond indeed to no FDI °ows between countries. Moreover, taking into account
that a non trivial number of the °ows in the data set are negative, (and thus there is no truncation
in the data) if one adopts the Heckman model all this information would be lost.22
Another approach to deal with the missing values in the FDI °ow is to use the information of
the bilateral stocks of FDI and set a rule to put zeroes or missing values as Daude and Stein (2006)
do. In particular these authors, who are interested in studying the determinants of FDI stocks, use
the following rule:
² Change the missing value to zero if all the FDI °ows between the two countries are either zero
or missing.
² Leave the reported missing value of the stock data if there is some non-zero FDI °ow between
the corresponding country pair.
21For instance Daude and Stein (2006) uses FDI stocks and Razin, Rubinstein, and Sadka (2004) use three-year
averages of °ows.
22The OECD data reports 3,055 negative bilateral FDI °ows from a total of 22,553 observations.
18As can be seen from this discussion it is di±cult to implement a similar rule to distinguish
the truly zero FDI °ows among the missing values since the existence of a °ow implies a stock
(at least in the short run) but the existence of a stock does not imply a °ow in a future period.
Consequently, we will leave the missing data as it is reported in the original source and treat this
as a missing data problem.
5 Empirical Evidence
5.1 E®ects of Defaults on FDI
In this section we present and discuss the results of the empirical strategy described in the preceding
section. The evidence suggests that after a country defaults on its foreign sovereign debt, FDI °ows
from its creditors declines. On the other hand, the amount of debt defaulted does not seem to
a®ect the magnitude of the decline in FDI in°ows. Finally, the data does not suggest that defaulter
countries face higher hurdles to invest abroad after default episodes.
Table 7 presents the ¯rst set of results of equation (1). In the ¯rst column the coe±cient of
the variable Unilateral indicates that a country defaulting on its debt sees its FDI in°ows reduced
in around 0.05 percent points of its GDP. This e®ect is signi¯cant from an economic point of view
since the mean value of bilateral FDI °ows to GDP is 0.07 percentage points. Our next step is to
exploit the characteristics of our data and examine if this decline in FDI °ows to defaulting countries
is more pronounced for their creditors. This will help us to gauge the existence of a punishment
mechanism from the creditors to defaulters. We do this adding the variable Paris to the regression
and the results appear in the second column of Table 7.
As can be seen, the coe±cient of Paris is negative and signi¯cantly di®erent from zero while
the coe±cient of Unilateral turns out to be positive. The data suggests then that it is important to
separate the decline in FDI °ows between both types of countries since it seems to be the case that
the default punishment comes from countries directly involved and not from everywhere. Quan-
titatively, our estimates imply that the average reduction of FDI °ows from creditor to defaulter
countries is around 0.07 percentage points of GDP.23; 24
23Follows from the sum of the coe±cients of Unilateral and Paris.
24In a regression where Paris but not Unilateral is included the coe±cient of Paris is also negative and signi¯cant.
This suggests the statistical signi¯cance of Paris in the regressions reported in Table 7 is not driven by the inclusion
of the variable Unilateral. This regression is not reported in the paper and is available from the authors upon request.
19As explained earlier, the coe±cient of Paris can be interpreted as a punishment that creditors
impose to defaulter countries. Even though countries that default on their sovereign debt are with
high likelihood undergoing a macroeconomic disruption that could explain the decline in FDI in°ows,
those e®ects would be captured by the other controls in the regression. In particular, the variable
Unilateral would be useful to capture these e®ects since it captures the impact of default on FDI
in°ows to the defaulter country coming from any country in the world.25 Thus, we interpret the
marginal e®ect of the countries involved in the renegotiation as a punishment to defaulters.
The estimation of the punishment to defaulters through the coe±cient ¯ is not likely to
be a®ected by a problem of reverse causality. This is due to the fact that countries involved in
renegotiations at the Paris Club are exogenously determined at the time of default since the loan
contracts were signed before the default takes place. Therefore countries that sit at the Paris Club
to renegotiate sovereign payments are not selected on the basis of current FDI °ows. On the other
hand, one should also consider that renegotiation with sovereign creditors at the Paris Club takes
place after the country has ceased to meet its debt obligations. Then, from this perspective, our
variable Paris measures default with some lag. Therefore the reverse causality concern is diminished
by this consideration that makes unlikely that current FDI °ows a®ect the decision to default taken
previously.
We analyze next if the size of debt under renegotiation plays any role in the punishment.
Capital markets may punish more those countries defaulting on a large amount of debt than coun-
tries defaulting on a small amount. Our database has information on the amount involved in the
renegotiation process in the Paris Club and we take this as a measure of the size of default. As
explained earlier, we only have data on the total amount of debt renegotiated by each defaulter
with all its creditors. In other words, there is no information on the amount of debt renegotiated
by the defaulter with each of its creditors. 26 This feature of the data impedes the inclusion of
an interaction term between the Paris variable and the amount defaulted to each creditor, that
would had told us how the punishment of each creditor varies with the size of his losses. In spite
of this there is evidence that the size of the punishment is indeed increasing in the amount of debt
defaulted.
In column 3 of Table 7 we add then to the regression the variable Amount constructed as
the amount renegotiated as a share of defaulter countries' GDP. The coe±cient of this variable
has a negative sign and is signi¯cantly di®erent from zero. In column 4 of Table 7 we drop from
the regression the variable Paris and we see that the amount over GDP's coe±cient continues
25Moreover, as we noted above, our set of control variables includes additional controls for the stage of the business
cycle variables of the recipient economy and if it is facing a Balance of Payment crisis.
26Also, as explained before, we do not have data on the size of the e®ective creditors' losses (\haircuts") in the
renegotiation process.
20signi¯cantly less than zero but the size has not increased signi¯cantly in magnitude. The coe±cient
in column 4 says that when the amount involved in the renegotiation rises one standard deviation,
which is, 1.85 percentage points of GDP, FDI in°ows °ows are reduced in 0.005 percentage points.
This magnitude is not signi¯cant from an economic point of view since the mean of bilateral FDI
in°ows in our sample is 0.07% of GDP. The evidence suggests then that the punishment to countries
doesn't increase at the margin in an economically relevant magnitude with the amount defaulted.
Our next empirical exercise is to test for another plausible punishment for default highlighted
in the theoretical literature; that is, limits to the purchase of foreign assets for the defaulter. We
test this hypothesis including in regression (1) the dummy variable Exclude as explained in Section
4. If defaulter countries are precluded from investment opportunities abroad as a cost of defaulting
we would ¯nd a negative sign on this variable. The results of this estimation appear column 5 of
Table 7 and do not support this hypothesis: the coe±cient of this variable turns out to be positive
suggesting that FDI out°ows from countries that default increase in those periods.
Summarizing the ¯ndings of this section, we show that defaulting countries do see reduced
their FDI °ows which constitutes evidence in favor of capital markets punishing countries that do
not repay their debts. The evidence suggests that not all countries punish the defaulter but only the
ones directly a®ected by the default. In the repayment to conserve reputation argument highlighted
in the theoretical literature, this result implies that defaulters would not lose reputation vis a vis
all countries but would lose it only with countries that are directly a®ected. The evidence suggest
that the size of the renegotiation is not important in magnitude to explain the reduction in FDI
in°ows over and above the presence of a default by itself. We do not ¯nd evidence indicating that
closing defaulters investment opportunities abroad is a relevant default punishment.
5.2 E®ects of Reputation
In this section we will complement the previous analysis looking at how a country's default record
in the past a®ects the amount of FDI °ows it receives. We will look then at the extent to which
the country's reputation as a bad (or good) payer a®ects the amount of capital °ows it receives.
This exercise can shed light on several interesting issues related to international capital °ows and
defaults. First, it is natural to think that countries with large records of defaults have a worse
reputation as good payers than countries that have a short record and, consequently, receive less
capital °ows. Also, the default punishment is likely to be temporary in nature. Countries that
default would not be permanently excluded from capital markets and condemned to permanent
21autarky; rather it is likely that after some time the capital °ows return to previous levels.27 Our
analysis will help to quantify the strength and relevance of these features of international capital
markets.
We test these hypothesis using the variables in matrix Z that we add to regression (1). The
¯rst regression, presented in column one of Table 8, adds to the basic speci¯cation a variable that
measures the amount of time (measured in years) elapsed from a country's last default. The coe±-
cient of this variable would indicate the rate at which countries are forgiven by their creditors. Since
we observe that countries are not kept out of the international ¯nancial community permanently,
we expect a positive sign for this coe±cient: the longer the time elapsed from the last default the
higher capital °ows to the country should be. The regression indicates that this coe±cient is indeed
positive, although it is not signi¯cantly di®erent from zero at usual con¯dence levels. The point
estimate we obtain (0.003) says that around 17 years would be needed to neutralize the negative
contemporaneous e®ect of a default.28 Interestingly, Rose (2005) ¯nds that the e®ect of defaults on
trade last for approximately 14 years.29
In column 2 of Table 8 we incorporate to the regression a variable that corresponds to the
number of bilateral defaults in the previous ¯ve years. The coe±cient of this last variable is negative
suggesting that countries are not only punished contemporaneously for defaulting (measured by
Paris) but also for their misdeeds in recent years. This ¯nding indicates then that the track record
of a country is important in determining its capital °ows. This is consistent with the hypothesis
that international capital markets care about countries reputation as good payers. The higher the
number of defaults in the past the lower the reputation and, consequently, the lower the °ows to
that country.
In similar spirit to the previous exercises we include in column 3 of Table 8 a new variable
with the number of bilateral defaults incurred by a country during the period before the previous
ten years.30 Using this variable allows us to check if the negative e®ect of default's record decreases
over time. If this were the case we would observe that the number of defaults incurred in the last
¯ve years have a higher e®ect than the number of defaults incurred before the last ten years. This
is what we ¯nd as can be seen in column 3 of table 8. The coe±cient of the number of defaults
incurred before the previous ten years is smaller than that of the number of defaults in the last 5
27Casual observation indicates that countries that have defaulted recently have done so in the past which suggests
that exclusion from capital markets would be temporary and that the record of defaults may be important to determine
capital °ows to a country.





29He calculates that number using the default variable lagged in his regressions.
30In other words we test if bilateral FDI °ows in year t are a®ected by the total number of defaults observed before
year t ¡ 10.
22years and it is not signi¯cantly di®erent from zero. We do not use the number of defaults incurred
between the previous ¯ve and ten years because of the high correlation between this variable and
the ones referring to the number of defaults in the last ¯ve years and older than ten years used in
the regression.
Our ¯nal speci¯cation aims to test if a default in the past implies a reduction of current FDI
in°ows for the country and if this e®ect persist or declines over time. For this we construct two
dummy variables. The ¯rst one takes the value 1 if the country has made one or more defaults in
any of the previous ¯ve years and the second one takes the value 1 if the country committed one or
more defaults in any year between t ¡ 6 and t ¡ 10. These variables di®er with the previous ones
because they do not control by the intensity of default as measured by the total number of default
in each window of time. In this sense we are measuring here if the eventual stigma of sovereign
defaulters is worsened or not by more episodes of default. On the other hand, countries undergoing
payment di±culties might conduct more than one round of negotiations with the Paris Club over
a period of, for example, three years. In our data each of these negotiations will be recorded as a
di®erent default episode.31 Therefore, this speci¯cation will also serve as a robustness check of our
previous results.
The results of these regressions appear in column 4 of Table 8. The sign of the contempo-
raneous default variable (Paris) is negative as always. The dummy variable that considers if a
default existed in the last ¯ve years has a negative sign while the other dummy variable enters with
a positive sign and it is not signi¯cantly di®erent from zero. The coe±cient of this last variable
is lower than (the absolute value) of the dummy indicating if there was a default in the previous
¯ve years. This result suggests that the e®ects of default last for some years but the punishment
decreases over time.
We recognize that we may have used somewhat rigid structures in our estimations. For
example, there is no particular motive to split the lag variables in the way we have or there is no
reason a priori to split the variable for the number of defaults in the way we have split it. However,
we have tried alternative speci¯cations and the results are similar pointing to the same direction.
Summarizing, the evidence suggests that the penalty imposed by capital markets is temporary
rather than permanent and that countries' default record is important. This suggests that countries
reputation as good payers is important for capital °ows.
31As can be seen in Table 1 there are several cases where countries renegotiated their sovereign debts with the Paris
Club more than once on a span of three years.
236 Conclusions
Sometimes countries have ¯nancial di±culties and they have to restructure or default on their debts.
Since sovereign default is by no means the norm in international capital markets and countries try
to avoid it, the unilateral interruption of debt payments probably carries some cost to the defaulter
country. Several possible default costs have been identi¯ed by commentators and the literature.
Of these, the exclusion from capital markets is arguably the most cited one. This is the default
punishment we have tried to test empirically in this paper. We extend previous research in this
area by focusing on the borrower-lender relationship, characteristics of defaults and the analysis of
some characteristics that would in°uence countries' reputation as good payers.
In our study we focused on FDI °ows, which has become a very important source of capital
to developing countries. The data on FDI °ows and Sovereign Debt renegotiation that we used
identi¯es the FDI source and recipient countries as well as the countries involved in the renegotiation
(i.e. debtor and creditors seeing their claims renegotiated). This is a key feature of the data and
allows the identi¯cation of a punishment to defaulters since we distinguished the impact of default
on FDI °ows coming from those countries directly involved in the default renegotiation from those
not directly a®ected by the default.
Our ¯ndings indicate that the reduction in FDI in°ows does not originate from every country
that could be a potential source of funds but only from those directly involved in the renegotiation.
This evidence suggests that the punishment that follows a sovereign default is not universal since
it appears to be con¯ned to those countries whose debt claims were defaulted on. We also analyzed
if the size of the debts renegotiated a®ects the punishment. The evidence suggests that the size
of the default is not very important in determining the severity of the punishment: the amount
renegotiated does not explain much of the reduction of capital °ows over and above the presence
of the process by itself. Next, with the objective of identifying another element of the nature of
the punishment, we test if defaulter's investment abroad are reduced after a default as suggested
by some theoretical contributions. We did not ¯nd any evidence in favor of that hypothesis.
We also identi¯ed some defaulters' characteristics that are likely to a®ect their reputation to
see if they are indeed important determinants of countries' capital in°ows. First, we inquire to what
extent countries with a large default record have a worse reputation than countries with relatively
better repayment performance and thus receive less capital °ows. Then we studied some dynamic
aspects of punishments to defaulter like if they have a temporary component and the speed to which
defaulters are forgiven by their creditors.32 Our empirical ¯ndings point in the same direction: the
32As noted in the literature review some previous contributions have tested if past defaults a®ect capital °ows to a
24higher the number of defaults the lower the capital °ows to that country and default punishment
vanishes as time goes by.
Overall, the our ¯ndings support the existence of a punishment for defaulting countries. We
leave for future research the related question if this cost of default e®ectively in°uences the decision
to default.
country, for example Ozler (1993) and Eichengreen and Portes (2000)
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27Table 1: Paris Club Renegotiations
(Data since 1980)




Argentina 1985 1987 1989 1991 1992
Benin 1989 1991 1993 1996 2000 2003
Bolivia 1986 1988 1990 1992 1995 1998 2001
Brazil 1983 1987 1988 1992
Bulgaria 1991 1992 1994
Burkina Faso 1991 1993 1996 2000 2002
Cambodia 1995
Cameroon 1989 1992 1994 1995 1997 2001
Central African Republic 1981 1983 1985 1988 1990 1994 1998
Chad 1989 1995 1996 2001
Chile 1985 1987
Congo 1986 1990 1994 1996 2004
DR of Congo 1981 1983 1985 1986 1987 1989 2002 2003
Costa Rica 1983 1985 1989 1991 1993
Cote D'Ivoire 1984 1985 1986 1987 1989 1991 1994 1998 2002
Croatia 1995
Dominican Republic 1985 1991 2004
Ecuador 1983 1985 1988 1989 1992 1994 2000 2003
Egypt 1987 1991
El Salvador 1990
Equatorial Guinea 1985 1989 1992 1994
Ethiopia 1992 1997 2001 2002 2003
Gabon 1987 1988 1989 1991 1994 1995 2000 2004
Gambia 1986 2003
Ghana 1996 2001 2002 2004
Guatemala 1993
Guinea 1986 1989 1992 1995 1997 2001
Guinea-Bissau 1987 1989 1995 2001
Guyana 1989 1990 1993 1996 1999 2004
Haiti 1995
Honduras 1990 1992 1996 1999 2004 2005
Indonesia 1998 2000 2002 2005
Jamaica 1984 1985 1987 1988 1990 1991 1993
Jordan 1989 1992 1994 1997 1999 2002
Kenya 1994 2000 2004
Kyrgyz Republic 2002 2005
Liberia 1980 1981 1983 1984
Macedonia 1995 2000
Madagascar 1981 1982 1984 1985 1986 1988 1990 1997 2000 2001 2004
Malawi 1982 1983 1988 2001
Mali 1988 1989 1992 1996 2000 2003
Mauritania 1985 1986 1987 1989 1993 1995 2000 2002
Mexico 1983 1986 1989
Morocco 1983 1985 1987 1988 1990 1992
Mozambique 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1998 1999 2001
Nicaragua 1991 1995 1998 2002 2004
Niger 1983 1984 1985 1986 1988 1990 1994 1996 2001 2004
Nigeria 1986 1989 1991 2000
Pakistan 1981 1999 2001
Panama 1985 1990
Peru 1983 1984 1991 1993 1996
Philippines 1984 1987 1989 1991 1994
Poland 1981 1985 1987 1990 1991
Romania 1982 1983
Russia 1993 1994 1995 1996 1999
28Country Years in which the Country started Negotiations with the Paris Club
Rwanda 1998 2002 2005
Sao Tome And Principe 2000
Senegal 1981 1982 1983 1985 1986 1987 1989 1990 1991 1994 1995 1998 2000 2004
Sierra Leone 1980 1984 1986 1992 1994 1996 2001 2002
Somalia 1985 1987
Sri Lanka 2005
Sudan 1982 1983 1984
Tanzania 1986 1988 1990 1992 1997 2000 2002
Togo 1981 1983 1984 1985 1988 1989 1990 1992 1995
Trinidad And Tobago 1989 1990
Turkey 1980
Uganda 1981 1982 1987 1989 1992 1995 1998 2000
Ukraine 2001
Vietnam 1993
Yemen 1996 1997 2001
Yugoslavia 1984 1985 1986 1988 2001
Zambia 1983 1984 1986 1990 1992 1996 1999 2002 2005
29Table 2: Countries in OECD FDI Database
(Sample Period: 1980-2003)
Industrial OECD Developing OECD Non OECD
Australia Czech Republic Bulgaria
Austria Hungary Romania
Belgium Korea Russia
Canada Mexico Slovak Republic
Denmark Poland Slovenia
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32Table 5: FDI and Default Data
(Descriptive Statistics)
Variable Name Mean Median Standard Min Max
Deviation
FDI In°ow / GDP of Recipient, % 0.07 0.0005 0.40 -7.1 18.9
FDI In°ow per Capita1 10.8 0.0237 165.1 -3594.9 18161.5
Paris 0.03 0 0.18 0.0 1.0
Amount Defaulted2 1976.1 411 4758.3 1.0 40200.0
1 In dollars of 2000
2 In millions of dollars of 2000.
Table 6: Regressions Varibles Descriptive Statistics
Variable Name Mean Standard
Deviation
Max Min
Product GDPs per capita 13.06 7.82 37.79 1.05
Product GDPs 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00
Regional Agreement 0.15 0.35 1.00 0.00
Capital Account Openess 1.11 1.51 2.68 -1.71
Financial Development 0.49 1.97 11.92 0.00
In°ation Volatility 0.25 1.87 30.80 -0.01
Openess 58.72 32.74 228.88 12.35
Di®erence in Years of Schooling -0.26 1.83 4.36 -4.55
Government Stability 7.80 1.86 11.08 1.00
Non Corruption Index 4.31 1.35 6.00 0.00
Executive Constraints 6.44 1.14 7.00 1.00
33Table 7: Regression Results 1
(Dependent Variable: FDI In°ow to Host's GDP in year t (%) )
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Unilateral -0.046 0.051 0.052 -0.025 0.051
[0.023]** [0.028]* [0.028]* [0.025] [0.028]*






GDP per capita country j 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009
[0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]***
Trade Treaty 0.101 0.102 0.102 0.102 0.102
[0.047]** [0.047]** [0.047]** [0.047]** [0.047]**
Capital Account Openness 0.009 0.009 0.01 0.01 0.01
[0.005]** [0.005]** [0.005]** [0.005]** [0.005]**
Financial Development -0.014 -0.014 -0.014 -0.014 -0.014
[0.006]** [0.006]** [0.006]** [0.006]** [0.006]**
In°ation Volatility -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
[0.002]* [0.002]* [0.002]* [0.002]* [0.002]*
Trade Openness 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
[0.001]** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]** [0.001]***
Di®erence in Years of Schooling 0.031 0.03 0.03 0.031 0.03
[0.021] [0.021] [0.021] [0.021] [0.021]
Government Stability 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
[0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]**
Non Corruption Index 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
[0.005]** [0.005]** [0.005]** [0.005]** [0.005]**
Executive Constraints 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
[0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006]
IMF Program 0.016 0.017 0.018 0.018 0.017
[0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013]
Crisis -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 -0.005
[0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012]
Output Gap Country j 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
[0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]**
Output Gap Country i 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
Constant -0.29 -0.292 -0.291 -0.289 -0.293
[0.067]*** [0.067]*** [0.067]*** [0.067]*** [0.067]***
Observations 10441 10441 10441 10441 10441
R
2 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42
Robust standard errors in brackets.
* signi¯cant at 10%; ** signi¯cant at 5%; *** signi¯cant at 1%.
34Table 8: Regression Results 2
(Dependent Variable: FDI In°ow to Host's GDP in year t (%) )
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unilateral 0.052 0.052 0.051 0.044
[0.028]* [0.028]* [0.028]* [0.028]
Paris -0.103 -0.107 -0.107 -0.087
[0.038]*** [0.037]*** [0.039]*** [0.036]**
Years elapsed since previous bilateral default 0.003
[0.002]
Number of Defaults between t ¡ 1 and t ¡ 5 -0.037 -0.038
[0.016]** [0.016]**
Number of Defaults before t ¡ 10 -0.001
[0.019]
At least one Default between t ¡ 1 and t ¡ 5 -0.088
[0.030]***
At least one Default between t ¡ 5 and t ¡ 10 0.050
[0.035]
GDP per capita country j 0.009 0.010 0.01 0.010
[0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]***
Trade Treaty 0.102 0.103 0.103 0.106
[0.047]** [0.048]** [0.048]** [0.048]**
Capital Account Openness 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.007
[0.004]* [0.004]** [0.005]** [0.005]
Financial Development -0.014 -0.014 -0.014 -0.014
[0.006]** [0.006]** [0.006]** [0.006]**
In°ation Volatility -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001
[0.002]* [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Trade Openness 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
[0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]***
Di®erence in Years of Schooling 0.031 0.031 0.031 0.030
[0.021] [0.021] [0.021] [0.021]
Government Stability 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003
[0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]*
Non Corruption Index 0.010 0.012 0.012 0.012
[0.005]** [0.005]** [0.005]** [0.005]**
Executive Constraints 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.012
[0.006]* [0.006]* [0.006]* [0.007]*
IMF Program 0.018 0.024 0.024 0.024
[0.013] [0.013]* [0.013]* [0.013]*
Crisis -0.006 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007
[0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012]
Output Gap Country j 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
[0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]*
Output Gap Country i 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
Constant -0.299 -0.302 -0.303 -0.313
[0.069]*** [0.068]*** [0.067]*** [0.069]***
Observations 10441 10441 10441 10441
R2 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42
Robust standard errors in brackets.
* signi¯cant at 10%; ** signi¯cant at 5%; *** signi¯cant at 1%.
35A Comparing Di®erent Measures of Sovereign Default
As we have explained, we say that a country is in sovereign default of its external debts if it
renegotiates its o±cial obligations through the Paris Club in a given year. Even though this measure
of default has it own merits (most notably it identi¯es the individual creditors of the defaulter) it
certainly is not the only measure of default available. Moreover it measures default only of o±cial
nature (i.e. government to government loans) which might not constitute the most signi¯cant
foreign liability of the country. In light of these possible objections to our measure of default we
compare the Paris Club indicator with the sovereign default information compiled by Standard and
Poor's. This institution compiles a list that indicates the years during which a country's sovereign
foreign debt, either bonds or bank loans, was in default.33 This Standard and Poor's indicator of
default has been used in several papers that have studied this topic before. In order to gauge how
similar our Paris Club indicator is to the Standard and Poor's one we calculated the probability that
Standard and Poor's considers that a country's foreign debt (bonds and bank loans) is in default in
the year that that country renegotiates with its Paris Club creditors. We calculated this probability
for various time spans during which Standard and Poor's might classify a country in default and
the results appear in Table 934.
Table 9: Probability (%) of being in Sovereign Debt Default
if country renegotiated its O±cial Debt in Paris Club
Default in t Default in t or t ¡ 1 Default in t, t ¡ 1 or t ¡ 2 Default in t, t ¡ 1, t ¡ 2 or t ¡ 3
64.1 64.6 71.0 73.0
As can be seen in Table 9 the likelihood that a country who is renegotiating at the Paris Club
is also in default of its other external sovereign liabilities is substantial. Moreover, Table 1 suggests
that Paris Club renegotiations tend to occur after the country has defaulted on its other debts: the
probability increases if we allow for a larger time span during which Standard and Poor's might have
considered the country in default.35 This point has important implications for our identi¯cation
strategy because the Paris Club captures to some extent default episodes that occur a few years
before which lessens the likelihood of reverse causation going from capital °ows to sovereign default.
33See Standard and Poor's (2004) for the complete list of defaults compiled by Standard and Poor's
34The numbers in the table correspond to the probability that a country is renegotiating its foreign debt at the
Paris Club in year t given that it is classi¯ed as a sovereign defaulter by Standard and Poor's during in at least one
of the years between t and t ¡ i for i = 0;1;2;3.
35The assertion that default to banks and bond loans tends to precede Paris Club renegotiations is reinforced by the
fact that the probability that a country classi¯ed as a defaulter by Standard and Poor's given that it is renegotiating
at the Paris Club is only 25%, much lower than the values that appear in Table 9.
36B Data Appendix
Foreign Direct Investment Flows The FDI °ows are taken from the OECD's International
Direct Investment Statistics Yearbook 1980-2003. Each bilateral °ow is in millions of US dollars
and is normalized by the host's country nominal GDP in dollars taken from the World Bank's World
Development Indicators (WDI) database available in http://sima-ext.worldbank.org/query/
and expressed in percentage points in the regressions.
Countries in the OECD report both out°ows and in°ows of FDI observed each year among them and
all the countries detailed Table 2. Therefore, for the countries in the OECD there are two potential
sources for the same bilateral FDI °ow that country i sends to country j: (i) The out°ow reported by
country i to country j and (ii) the in°ow reported by country j from country i. Theoretically both
magnitudes should be identical but di®erences in each country's reporting standards will usually
imply that they di®er in practices. We assume that the in°ow data is more likely to re°ect the
\true" identity of the source country. Given this, we will measure the FDI in°ow from country i to
country j as the one in°ow reported by country j from country i whenever possible.
On the other hand, countries located in what we call in this paper Developing OECD are recent
admits to that organization so they have not reported FDI data over an extended period of time.
Therefore, in order to maximize the amount of observations, we will use the data reported by
Industrial OECD countries when the FDI °ows involves a Developing OECD country. Finally, the
OECD data obviously does not collect information reported by countries that do not belong to that
organization so we must rely on the data reported by OECD countries in this case. The details of
the information used for each type of bilateral FDI °ow are provided in Table 10.
Table 10: Details of OECD FDI Database
Source
Destination Industrial OECD Developing OECD Non-OECD
Industrial OECD In°ow reported by Destination In°ow reported by Destination In°ow reported by Destination
Developing OECD Out°ow reported by Source In°ow reported by Destination In°ow reported by Destination
Non-OECD Out°ow reported by Source Out°ow reported by Source No data
Paris Club Data All the Paris Club data used in this paper is available at the institutions' website
(http://www.clubdeparis.org). We completed the information for the period 1956-1997 that is
available in Professor Andrew Rose's website (http://haas.berkeley.edu/»arose) with the data
from the Paris Club's website. The amount of debt which the creditors bring to the negotiating
table is in millions of US dollars and is normalized by the debtor's country nominal GDP in dollars
from the WDI and expressed in percentage points.
GDP Data GDP per capita is calculated dividing the total GDP in constant year 2000 dollars and
the total population of the country in each year. Both series are taken from the WDI database.
Regional Trade Agreements This data is compiled by the World Trade Organization (WTO)
and we extended the information that is available in Andrew Rose's website up to year 1997 with
the latest information available at: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/region e/region e.
htm.
Capital Account Openness To measure this we use the index constructed by Chinn and Ito (2002)
which is available at Menzi Chinn's webpage http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/»mchinn/research.html.
37Higher values of this variable indicate that the economy is more open to cross-border capital °ows.
Financial Development We use the ratio of credit to the private sector to nominal GDP suggested










where t denotes the corresponding year and:
1. F is credit by deposit money banks (line 22d from the International Financial Statistics (IFS)
of the IMF) and other ¯nancial institutions (line 42d from the IFS) to the private sector .
2. GDP is nominal GDP from the WDI.
3. Pe is end-of period CPI (line 64 from the IFS)
4. Pa is the average annual CPI.
Openness Correspond to the traditional measure of trade openness that measures the ratio of a
country's total trade (exports plus imports) to its GDP. All the series are taken from the WDI
database and the resulting index is measured in percentage points.
In°ation Volatility This is de¯ned as the standard deviation of the monthly in°ation rate (mea-
sured in percentage points) observed in the 12 months of each year. This is calculated with the
with CPI data from the IFS.
Di®erence in Years of Schooling. This is computed as the di®erence in the average years of
secondary schooling in the total population of country j and that of country i. The information
is taken from the Barro and Lee database which contains the educational attainment data every
¯ve years. In order to obtain information for each year we used a linear interpolation procedure
available in the statistical software Stata 8.0.
Government Stability According to the International Country Risk by PRS Group which pro-
duces these data this index measures the governments ability to carry out its declared program(s),
and its ability to stay in o±ce. The average yearly rating varies from 0 to 12, where a higher score
means lower risk.
Non Corruption Index This is assessment of corruption within the political system. The average
yearly rating ranges from 0 to 6, where a higher score means lower corruption risk. The source of
this data is also the International Country Risk by PRS Group.
International Monetary Fund (IMF) Programs This data comes from the IMF and gives
information on the type of IMF program under which the country and contains details on the
starting and ending date of each agreement.
38Balance of Payment Crisis This dummy variable is built following Kaminsky and Reinhart
(1999), see their data appendix for the exact de¯nition.
GDP Gaps We calculate them as the di®erence between the current GDP and the trend GDP
measured by the Hodrick and Prescott ¯lter procedure in Stata 9.0.
Standard and Poor's default indicator The information appears in Standard and Poor's (2004)
and a country was considered to be in default if it either its \Foreign Currency Bond Debt" or
\Foreign Currency Bank Debt" was said to be in default by this ¯nancial institution.
39